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After the deconstruction of the unitary concept of West into several Wests,    
the epistemic revision  taking place in social and cultural studies is examined with 
reference to the notion of symbolic violence (chap. 1). It is the fundamental concept 
of the entire essay, indicating the pervasive symbolic dimension of the construction 
of identity, which, according to the case in question, has become injurious 
interiorization of distorted images of the self. By means of the categories of memory 
and repression, the  notion of symbolic violence is employed in the diagnosis of the 
‘condition of  concealment of the post-colonial past’ of the European polity (chap. 
2). Through the  concept of adaptive preferences,  which should be understood as a 
variant of the notion of symbolic violence coined by gender studies,  it is possible to 
examine some forms of inequality and difference, having in common various kinds 
of subjugation to domination (chap. 3); such an approach is useful to provide more 
ductile and effective tools for their analytical identification and conceptual 
definition, so as to facilitate their elimination, on the level of concrete  policies 
(chap. 4). 
 
1. The way the European West deals with the categories of symbolic violence  
 
We assume to be in an age of Occidentalism1, in which the direction of the 
classifying and defining perspective has changed consciously. In some respect, a  
deliberate reversal among scholars and depositories of expert knowledge has 
occurred. Something changed, no doubt. In the the so called scientific establishment, 
the model  of intellectual élite prevailing until the middle of the last century and 
made up of white male western scholars has been replaced by something that is 
                                                
1 E. Said, Orientalism. Western Conception of the Orient, Vintage, London-New York 1976; S. 
Shimada, Aspetti della traduzione culturale: il caso dell’“Asia”, in B. Henry (a cura di), Mondi 
globali, ETS, Pisa 2000, pp. 137-159. 
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constituted by more gender-sensitive, decolonized and decentralized currents and 
energies. However, there is a long way before the legitimization of such a model 
takes root in curricular and academic policies2. And certainly such an ideal 
revolution is slow to permeate common consciousness, that is, the levels of 
awareness existing throughout western societies. 
It should not indeed be forgotten that it is only in the last few decades that the 
depositories of the cultural heritage of the European West have been observed and 
studied  methodically and by the institutions in which knowledge is produced by 
those who were once subject to processes of domination. This does not at all mean, 
as will be confirmed further on, that the processes of colonization really occurred on 
a tabula rasa, in a terra nullius; on the contrary, they occurred against the 
background of pre-existing socio-institutional histories and structures, which, even 
when they were destroyed or radically assimilated, influenced the colonial symbolic 
and material patterns of domination. In any case, the myth of peoples without a past 
is what the subjugated have been led to believe, in some countries, and for 
generations. One of the gravest injuries inflicted on the collective self-awareness of 
the colonized by the mechanisms of subjugation is precisely the denial and 
concealment at an institutional and scientific level of not only the relevance, but 
even the existence, of such shared and entangled histories3; in them, the existing 
asymmetries between the position of the dominated and the canonical descriptive 
language did not totally cancel the native aspects of self-representation. These 
elements came together in an spurious form and constituted partly the images of the 
identity of the dominated themselves, portrayed and stored in the minds of the 
colonists. For the dominated to have any  visibility, such  self-representations were 
already the product of processes of accommodation, selection and mutation. The 
notion of auto-ethnography defines such situations of cultural interchange4 as not 
free of domination. They were multilateral constructions, diversified context by 
context, marked by processes of creative resistance, or of self-regulation. In them, 
                                                
2 Id., Globalizing literary study, in “Publications of the Modern Language Association of America”, 
2001, 116, pp. 64-68, p. 65. 
3 S. Conrad, S. Randeira, Einleitung. Geteilte Geschichten, Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in 
Id. (Hrsg.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichs- und 
Kulturwissenschaften, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, pp. 9-50. 
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the reactive aspects combine with the proactive aspects, symbolico-cultural 
crystallizations endowed with a stable and  shared meaning, the results of which are 
neither pre-constituted nor predictable. 
 Such processes therefore initiated practices of symbolic creation through the 
construction of the nomenclature of all realities, natural and social. As such, they 
had a structural importance for the identities both of the colonizers and of the 
colonized, in that they established the very conditions of the visibility of physical 
and human entities, of individuals and social roles, of collective aggregates, of the 
spatial and symbolic structuring of the territories in which the colonists and 
colonized interacted asymmetrically. The antithesis between city and country, 
between savage world and civilized world, was rewritten in loco, and the 
transformation of the pre-existing urban structures was pursued in such a way as to 
redefine the identity of populations5. 
The theme of domination needs to be reinterpreted, with the necessary critical 
caution, as symbolic violence, in the sense of processes and vocabularies of  
asymmetrical and penalizing construction of the identities of the dominated6. This, 
with the restatement of the precious warning already suggested above by the 
mention of auto-ethnography: if such  individuals and groups were marginal in the 
weaving of the symbolic narratives that were socially and  politically determining 
for themselves and their own descendants, then the ubiquitous  consistence of the 
assumption should be contested, and related, context by context, to the situations 
and ways in which symbolic violence  is countered by  languages of  creativity, as 
                                                                                                                                    
4 M.L. Pratt, Introduction, in Id., Imperial Eyes. Travel Writing and Transculturation, Routledge, 
London/ New York 1989, in part. pp. 6-7. 
5 Impossible to mention all the literature on the subject. Emblematic H.L. Strauss, Tristes tropiques, 
Plon, Paris 1955; for an overall, updated vision, F.M. Tedesco, Violenza simbolica [Voce], in M. 
Flores (a cura di), Diritti umani. Cultura dei diritti e dignità della persona nell’epoca della 
globalizzazione, vol. II, Dizionario (H-W), Utet, Torino 2007. From the point of view of the cultural 
geography oriented towards  colonial studies see: S. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, Blackwell, London 
2007; D. Clayton, Critical Imperial and Colonial Geographies, in K. Anderson, Domosh, Pile, Thrift 
(eds), The Handbook of Cultural Geography, Sage, London 2003, pp. 354-368. ID, Imperial 
Geographies, in J. Duncan, N. Johnson, R. Schein (eds) A Companion to Cultural Geography, 
Blackwell, London 2004, pp. 449-68. S. Berthon, A. Robinson, The Shape of the World : The 
Mapping and Discovery of the Earth, George Philip Ed., London 1991. 
6 The expression indicates the normalization of domination, the fact of the omnipresence and the 
cognitive, perceptive and symbolic interiorization of it by the  dominated. “Le cose stanno così, e 
devono essere cosi, nessuno se ne stupisce, o si indigna”. In this sense, G. C. Spivak, Can the 
Subaltern speak?, in Cary Nelson, Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture, Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago 1988, pp. 271-313. 
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well as of resistance7. It remains, however, true that symbolic violence is exercised 
whenever the depositories of languages “lay down the law”, adopt  a perspective that 
is surreptitiously over-ordered, because falsely neutral and universal, on every 
dimension of social reality different from their own.  One of such master narratives 
is now to be considered and criticised by means of the category of symbolic 
violence. 
 
2. Memory and repression of the colonial past; the European West confronting 
itself 
 
With respect to the self-representations of which we, European westerners, are 
capable, the example of French republican colonialism would be paradigmatic for at 
least one of the most effective and pervasive narratives with which Europe has 
nourished its own identity, the universalism of the rights of freedom and equality,  
the lexicon of liberation from oppression. In drawing up and justifying such a 
narrative, the social subjects and beneficiaries of such an account would remain 
blind in the face of their own internal contradictions. Should the European West ever 
realize what it implies to be looked at in turn by someone else, it should confront at 
least three typologies of non-acknowledgement/concealment of its own misdeeds 
with respect to  the colonial past and to the present: ignoring. forgetting, repressing8. 
As developments in the qualitative social sciences show us, the three modes of 
concealment are by now part of a vocabulary that is shared by studies of memory 
and of remembering, and is no longer strictly restricted to the languages of 
psychoanalysis, of psychology, of schools of psychotherapy; rather it is enriched and 
complicated thanks to the contributions of the historical social disciplines, and those 
of political science.  
If, on the one hand, by memory (individual) is meant today a conceptual territory  
limited to the acquisition and maintenance (archiving, storing) of lived experiences 
and past actions9, on the other, by the concept of remembering is meant 
                                                
7 P. Bourdieu, Il dominio maschile (1998), Feltrinelli, Milano 1999. 
8 I owe the  classification to Alberto Pirni. 
9 Unlike common philosophical knowledge, (the same employed in the construction of the school and 
university system in Italy half a century ago ), in which the concept of memory indicated  “la 
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consciousness (Bewusstsein) of lived experiences and past actions in so far as they 
are past10. The said category of repression, not in mere antithesis to remembering, 
should no longer be considered an exclusive monopoly of the Freudian 
scholarship11. Rather, the descriptive nucleus relevant here for repression is that 
relating to the social mechanisms of  partial remembering, oriented towards the 
diminution of painful states. Such mechanisms elude, avoid, procrastinate the 
acknowledgement by the group of situations, conditions, states of things:  the 
conscious public treatment of such matters is perceived as heralding suffering and 
laceration. Such mechanisms are triggered if the origin of the predicted pain are 
guilty acts committed in the past and not yet admitted or punished. Such repression 
produces social pathologies because  it misleads and falsifies, to the detriment of  
the actors, the construction of the perspective that links the generations in a shared 
narrative, which cannot in any way coincide with self-deception and concealment, 
without  the  identify-forming narrative being condemned to implausibility and 
therefore to ineffectiveness. 
Such concealment  has produced the gravest aporia: an unduly selective, and 
therefore unjustified, ascription of such dignity of universal beings to some human 
groups, but not to all, even if provisionally. The unity of the human kind was  seen  
symbolically as a mission still to be accomplished with and through civilizing, not 
yet as an actual reality. We should not be reassured by the fact that such a process 
was put into effect by universalist politics,  outside and even antithetical to the 
racialist theories that preach the  natural and  insurmountable irreducibility of 
biological type between the higher human strain and those strains defined as 
inferior. What really establishes, legitimizes and  perpetuates the conditions, both 
outer and inner, of subordination is the  proclamation itself, for a population, of its 
temporary, but indefinite,  existence in a status of cultural, institutional and social 
                                                                                                                                    
presenza al soggetto di un passato stato di coscienza, riconosciuto per tale” [ E.P. Lamanna, E. 
Adorno, Dizionario di termini filosofici, Le Monnier, Firenze 1969]. As can be seen clearly, in such a 
definition memory encompasses remembering, if such a definition is compared with the semantic 
specification between the two terms, mentioned in the text* in testo. 
10 M. Quante, Identità [Voce], in N. Pethes, P. Ruchatz (a cura di), Dizionario della memoria e del 
ricordo, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2002, pp. 243-245. 
11 As well known, it’s the theory of the stages through which the drives of the child are formed and 
reformed with respect to the potentialities of the libido, so that the child can achieve for him/herself 
security and vital equilibrium through elusions. This processes occurs by means of the harmonizing 
of one's own desires with the will of the family sovereign 
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minority; this status that can only be overcome under the guidance of and through 
emulation of the model of the colonizers. 
Refusing to confront the conceptual and symbolic subordination generated by the 
asymmetrical confrontation set up by the dominators with respect to “other”  
cultures, means failing to evaluate the true weight of colonial culture within not only 
French, but also European and Western culture12. The most subtly poisonous aspect 
of such a long-lasting and permanent non-declaration of one's own aporias is that 
this cognitive “repressed content” is still deceitfully pervasive with respect to the 
universalist and progressive model of emancipation, which, despite the recurrent 
criticisms regarding its effectiveness, is still considered by many to be the 
unquestioned conceptual cornerstone of the civil conscience and political identity of 
the Union tout court.  
If such an apparatus is not deconstructed, all the legitimate claims to be 
defending the lasting unassailable nucleus of the language of rights and 
emancipation against its detractors could be nullified. If such an apparatus is to be 
consolidated, because of his veritable core, a profound revisiting of its lexicon 
should be undertaken and the harm inflicted on the subjugated in their self-
representations should be taken into consideration; such moral “disablements” are 
the most long-lasting, also because they have not yet been recognized as such.  
Accepting as one's own a configuration, a form of the self made by others and 
for others is only one part of what has happened. The real problems are elsewhere: 
in the first place, what occurred, occurred because other models or other methods, 
possessing  sufficient credibility and adequate for conceiving and making others, 
were not available. The identity that is available is so inadequate and oppressive 
because  it is the dictate of those who establish its contexts, constraints and rules 
proves to be the sole one, exclusive, homogeneous, excluding possible alternatives. 
In the second place, the occlusive and disempowering effects of such a reductio ad 
unum cannot be cancelled with a mere act of will or conscious reflection, but last 
over time and over generations, producing, in the majority of cases, moral, social 
and political asphyxia. Such outcomes are induced by processes by which the 
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subordinate subjects interiorize an identity that is made to measure for others, but is 
inadequate, “ill-fitting” for them; for them it is a matter of adapting to identity 
constructs made up of socially appreciated qualities, and fixed as a universal 
objective of emancipation for all, without distinctions. It is precisely such constructs 
that the subordinate are called to emulate, deforming themselves in  order to fit the 
single model. The hetero-induced distortion cited by  Charles Taylor13, is another 
name for what reflection on gender calls “ill-fitting” identity14 or adaptive  
preferences, that is to say, the mechanisms through which the model is propagated 
are processes of interiorization, mimetic adaptation being the condition for the 
subordinate to be able to emerge in the competition for social resources. 
There is a need for critical studies in which the deconstruction of the concept of 
culture brings out the limits of a legitimizing acceptance of the taxonomy between 
civilized and non-civilized cultures; it should be stated that such a  contraposition is 
in line with a false postulate, that according to which the existence of an 
untranslatability between cultures and of cultural prisons is accepted and 
propagated as true. French republican colonialism and its contradictions constitute a 
clear example of what has just been outlined regarding the acceptance of the 
dichotomic vision according to which “my” culture is in its fundamentals 
untranslatable into the terms of “another” culture, because the latter is still in a 
condition of immaturity with respect to mine. This aggravates  therefore the task of 
those who, whether scientists and citizens, are setting about the work of revealing 
and recognizing the repression of identity that affects us. 
«Un homme à cheval sur deux cultures est rarement bien assis»15. The implicit 
reference is to the assumption that considers cultures mutually impermeable 
dimensions, shut in on themselves: the postulate of the incommunicability between 
                                                                                                                                    
12 D. Costantini, Per l’anamnesi di una malattia europea: il “nuovo discorso coloniale” Francese e i 
suoi critici, Tesi di Perfezionamento, in cotutela fra Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna – Pisa e Universitè 
de Paris VIII – Vincennes-Saint-Denis, 2006. 
13 Ch. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and “The Politics 
of Recognition”, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992, pp. 25-73 [“La politica del 
riconoscimento”, in A. Gutmann (a cura di), Multiculturalismo. La politica del riconoscimento, trad. 
it. di G. Rigamonti, Anabasi, Milano 1993, pp. 41-103; taken up in J. Habermas, Ch. Taylor, 
Multiculturalismo. Lotte per il riconoscimento, trad. it. di L. Ceppa e G. Rigamonti, Feltrinelli, 
Milano 20056, pp. 9-62]. 
14 G. Zincone, Uno schermo contro il razzismo, il Mulino, Bologna 1994; Id. (a cura di), Secondo 
rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna 2001. 
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cultures can even prepare the way for the naturalization of cultural differences. The 
presumption of incontrovertibility of the attribution, does not change, even if the 
contents and the sign, positive or negative, that is attributed to such features is 
modified. The positive values attributed by the colonized to the civil and social 
model being emulated are the confirmation of the position of inadequacy and 
inferiority in which subordinate persons find themselves with respect to such a 
model. 
From this point on, we will attempt to define and verify such a hypothesis, by 
dealing with more concrete situations of coexistence, in conditions of asymmetries 
of power. This is why, from now onward, we will try to deconstruct some common 
linguistic usages, taken for granted, but erroneously considered innocuous with 
respect to the position of individuals in relations of power, if we share the 
assumption that power is symbolic, defining and  constitutive of identities. 
 
3. Adaptive preferences,  deconstruction of languages  
 
As a concrete example starting from a particular context, let us take a riding 
lesson; the instructor should impart commands to a composite group of persons on 
horseback distinguishing “the horsemen” from the “horsewomen. If on the contrary 
he/she used the term “horse-riders” without distinction, he/she would obscure the 
fact that there are also women that practice the same sport; few know that the 
“horsewomen” are in the majority and reach extremely high levels in competitions. 
It is right to ask ourselves why female persons should be put into a single category, 
conceived moreover only as male, and therefore not even  genuinely neutral. We 
might not accept the levelling out of the two genders with the use of neutral gender; 
however, if we consent to it, we must demand that it be at least on ground that is 
truly neutral. In the previous case,  apparently one of the most innocuous, we would 
have the identification of the female with the male, which unduly takes it upon itself 
                                                                                                                                    
15 A. Memmi, Portrait du colonisé précedé de portrait du colonisateur, Gallimard, Paris 1957. 
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to include in itself and to represent incorrectly, that is, to be in the place of that 
which it is not, pretending unduly to be universal16.  
Such precise definition should prevent the concealment, the implicit repression, 
the automatic nature of a language of domination that structures minds, leaving no 
openings for insidious questions about the state of things. On the occasion, for 
example, of a lecture or congress, it is rare on the level of common awareness for the 
minority presence of female students to be noted. A completely male auditorium, 
and even more so a podium composed of only male speakers, does not in fact arouse 
any surprise, it is normal, and no-one understands why it should be otherwise. 
When, on the other hand, one sees assemblies, extremely rare, of women only, the 
fact arouses amazement on the part of those present. In the presence of men only, 
this does not happen because it is the norm. The normalization, the naturalization of 
relationships is what epistemic violence refers to, if we want to use it in the only 
specific and appropriate sense.  
It should not however be forgotten how the category of epistemic violence, if  
absolutized in its oppressive hyper-dimensionality and ubiquity, can become a trap 
even for those who would like to change such a  situation. The question  that is 
rightly raised, against Spivak's position, is about how we enable the subordinate to 
speak. If they do not have critical and reflexive capacity, being totally pervaded by 
the determining categorization and nomenclature, it can be  excluded that they are 
able to express themselves in their own voice.  This type of reasoning is has the 
same origin as the above-mentioned  dualism relative to the taxonomy between a 
civilized and non-civilized cultures. Despite the criticism of epistemic violence, 
                                                
16 Examples of a linguistic kind can help to understand more underhand and prejudicial shifts in the 
meaning of words. In the German language the term  Mensch means, grammatically, the “human 
kind” and continues to be used  consciously as a term of universal meaning whenever both genders 
taken together are being spoken of.  Along the lines of the verse from Genesis, it can be said that 
«male and female was created man alias human kind». The term homme also meant originally 
“human being” and still does not indicate univocally “male man”. However, it is in this last meaning 
that the term has surreptitiously absorbed into itself also the second gender, appearing as the one 
signifier for two different meanings, the male and the female. The place of such an undue 
 1
0 
Spivak in some of his formulations seems to reproduce the dualism according to 
which there are the dominating and the dominated, and the latter are crushed by their 
being dominated. Spivak, despite his attempts, does not seem to accept coherently 
what the critics of this approach call cultural dynamism,  osmosis, interrelation, 
conflictuality17. Relationship, interrelation, conflicts can change things, in a way 
which is unpredictable. It is an act of arrogance to think that the subordinate are 
poor, rejects, victims of destiny, and therefore incapable of reacting or planning, 
needing something originating elsewhere to enable them to speak.  
This is the doble limit of such an approach: on one hand,  that of fixing and 
“condemning”, again from the outside, even if with the assumption of liberation, the 
dominated to heteronomous definitions of their selves. On the other hand, the limit 
is to assert that there is the universal definition of domination, valid everywhere and 
for every situation. If we make use of an other category we could be more successful 
than in the previous case.  
 
4. Gender studies and pragmatic of vital languages 
 
Those who make proper use of the concept  of adaptive preferences18, have 
affirmed that it is not true that there exists a reciprocal incommunicability of 
languages and cultures. Nussbaum suggests an example; if Indian women are put 
into contact with the language of human rights and are shown that such a language 
                                                                                                                                    
assimilation heralded significantly epochal consequences; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen in 1789 has constituted the paradigm of the language of rights beyond imagination. 
17 G. C. Spivak, Critica della ragione postcoloniale (1999), Meltemi, Rome 2004. 
18 Some feminist scholars, going beyond the concept of subordination, speak, on the subject of 
women, not of subordinate groups, but of “moral minorities”. In this way the problem of minority in 
quantitative terms is thus cleared away. Women are in fact in the majority in merely numerical terms. 
It is not therefore a problem of numerical minority, but of moral minority. The moral majority is the 
dominant group that dictates the models of behaviour and of attitude. Such models are dictated in an 
apodeictic, absolutely incontrovertible, manner. Everyone knows that it is so and no-one calls it into 
question. The moral minority is, however, that group, which can even be enormous, of those who 
either cannot or does not want to be mimetic with respect to that set of identifying qualities. The 
discussion about the concept of adaptive preferences, as the feminists say, relates therefore exactly to 
the idea that the moral minority is that group upon which weighs the label of inferiority with respect 
to the  dominant model. 
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“works”, they will use it as an instrument of struggle against oppression19. Whether 
it is therefore a matter of human rights, or of dignity, is of no importance; women 
employ, in the majority of cases, a multiplicity of theoretical weapons, if it enables 
them to be free,  independently of their belonging to a particular culture. Therefore, 
particular attention be paid to the ways in which women assimilate, or not, the 
“adaptive preference. Indeed, we must not let ourselves be deceived. Resistances, 
micro-resistances, are often used by women, who act by resorting to the simulacrum 
of the patriarchal discourse; they empty it from the inside, by means of micro-
systems of autonomous creations, of development of marginal subjective identities, 
yes, but still female, and of a certain type20. They are therefore forms of ‘sabotage 
from within21’. 
. Examples as such are not  valid in all situations; they are narrative. There is not 
a will to generalize, but an extreme  attention to differences, to particular, real 
situations, that are interconnected and changeable. Starting from the application of 
such modesty on the part of those observing,  it must be presumed that there is an 
equally “unobtrusive” activity of internal erosion. That is, it must be recognized that 
not all the resistances of the subordinate are remarkable, or “insurrectionary”, as 
occurred, for example, recently in Burma or in Tibet. There are, for example, 
interesting  forms of resistance, like those taking place in Yemen, in which highly 
original case studies have been carried out. Thanks to such studies it was observed 
                                                
19 M. Nussbaum, Diventare persone. Donne e universalità dei diritti (2000), il Mulino, Bologna 
2001. 
20 Bartoli C., Subalternità, rappresentazioni sociali e rappresentanza politica, in «Ragion pratica», 
2004, 23. 
21 Moreover, one can also come to the conclusion that it is not possible to be emancipated from 
everything, since it is impossible to escape from certain  “opacities”, conditionings, unavoidable 
material constraints. If therefore it is true that not all the victims of adaptive preferences are victims 
forever, it is also true that one cannot free oneself definitively from all the distorted or prejudicial 
images of one's self. Social psychology in this connection speaks of the plasticity and pervasiveness 
of predispositions, of postures and moral attitudes, of the way we are accustomed to seeing ourselves 
in the mirror. Not all adaptive preferences can be eliminated and not always completely, because it is 
not so much a question of rationality, as of being part of a body that is a material-symbolic, historical 
and social, construct, which is indeed going through a process of change, but slowly and in not 
painless forms. 
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how Yemeni women, although forced to wear the full veil, have created places of 
feminine criticism and resistance. They have created a network that has linked up 
with international agents and observers.  
Furthermore, the global distribution of craft products, such as ethnic fashion, 
both niche and commercial, is what has been achieved by women's enterprises in 
Afghanistan. These women have, that is, begun to work towards winning economic 
independence. A form of economic independence is not everything, but can make 
them less subordinate and so less victims. Even if their husbands were to leave them, 
they would in fact be able to maintain themselves and their offspring without having 
to accept specific and lethal forms of domestic and family violence. Economic 
autonomy is obviously not the solution, but one of the possible solutions. 
Afghanistan and Yemen are two examples in which, paradoxically, despite the  
situations of oppression of every kind that women are subjected to, there are  
commercially interesting examples of women's entrepreneurship that are beginning 
to work and to find responses abroad.  With the acquisition of a greater visibility 
towards the outside, there is also transversality. Not only external/internal exists, 
there are the non-governmental organizations, there are international institutions, 
there are returning emigrés. There exists, that is, a plurality of agencies and netwoks. 
There exist various individuals that work, and act on situations, in various positions 
of power. Such pluralities must be kept in mind when initiating research that is 
oriented towards action, not forgetting that we must avoid giving credit  ex antea to 
our domestic vision of a particular reality. Thus reflexively controlled social praxis 
is configured with respect to the theory of the social sciences. Praxis becomes 
therefore the arena for the new scientific research. In language there is grammar, 
syntax, pragmatics; this last indicates and analyses the lived uses of the first two. 
The great teaching of praxis is that, if it becomes pragmatics of vital languages, it is 
at the same time the object and the context of knowledge.  This requires, of course, 
an infinity of cases, of possibilities, of microscopic pieces of  research. This 
obviously does not mean not having pre-constituted concepts, but admitting having 
them, and being prepared for them to be demolished or rectified. 
Therefore is appropriate even the metaphor of the journey towards the ideal point 
that is not known. Such a metaphorical journey presupposes the humility of those 
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who abstain from asserting and imposing their own vision of things. It is the 
humility of those who, going to a distant, and culturally alien country, do not speak 
for a year, but limit themselves to listening. Such a way of approaching events and 
situations is precisely the overturning of epistemic violence. This implies the 
following: to try to  perceive, to allow oneself to be aroused from within, not only 
through the mind, but also through modes of self-situating and acting, without 
obviously excluding the  possibility of saying no to certain fundamental questions, 
and rejecting imitation as such However, it is not only a matter of moral humility, 
but of a fundamental cognitive attitude. An extremely rich, and not only evocative,  
dimension of the hermeneutics, that of listening, should be recovered. Such a sphere 
of meaning contains within it the idea of allowing oneself to be carried away by 
languages, and by the feelings that emanate from them, under the control of a 
reflexive and feed-back methodology. Such methodological ductility goes hand in 
hand with the  intellectual honesty according to which it is necessary to start from 
the assumption that phenomena are probably  different from how we consider them 
at first. The solution will be reached, it is to be hoped, in the end. Starting from this 
predisposition one can therefore try to understand with an openness, as was said 
above, that is not only moral, but also cognitive. It is mental openness, and the  
willingness to let oneself be influenced, not mechanically, or mimetically, but rather 
in a nobly pragmatic manner. 
